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People v. Youngs, supra, the defendant procured burglar's tools and
met a confederate at a distance from the house they expected to rob.
Held not guilty. Yet in People v. Stites, 75 Cal. 570, 17 Pac. 693 (1888),
defendant was convicted of an attempt to place a bomb on a railroad
track when he was caught before he had reached the rendezvous with
his confederate. Many other examples of courts arriving at opposite
conclusions on similar states of fact could be given. This can be
attributed not to a difference in the law but to difference in judgment
as to the importance of the act done and the notice it deserves from
the law. It is submitted that this is as it should be because under a
flexible rule of this sort justice is more certain in a field of criminal
law where the number of possible situations is infinite, than it would
be under a strictly technical rule which could not possibly cover all
the factors which should be considered.
BRUCE MORFORD.
TuE EFFECT OF IirPOSSIBILITy ON CIIINTAL ATTE.PTs.* A-MEANS

USEn MUST BE APPARENTLY SuiTABLE.-It is difficult to say that any
particular means will certainly effect any particular end. The best
laid plans of which we may conceive are frustrated. The best rifles
loaded, Capped, primed and well aimed, may gmss fire; or the party
shot at may wear a coat of impenetrable armor. How then may we
under any circumstances do more than to say of any particular
agency, that it is "apparently" adapted to produce the end? The means
used must be apparently adequate, though the actor, by using such
means, is totally incapable of accomplishing the intended consummation.
In apparent conflict with the above view is a group of English
cases on statutes. In Rex v. Love?, 2 Moody & R. 39 (1837), it was
held "shooting of another person does not take place when the other
person is not in the place shot at, and that there can be no shooting
with 'loaded arms' when a gun is so stuffed that it cannot be fired."
In 1835 an English Court, Rex v. Whitley, 1 Lewin, C. C. 123, held
that if the -gun does not contain a sufficient amount of powder to be
discharged no attempt has been committed. But the ground on which
these cases were decided was that the statute used the words "loaded
arms," etc.' which were incorporated in the indictment, and averment
of which had to be substantially proved. On the other hand, the
offense is not an attempt if the party threatened knew the gun was not
loaded and was therefore not adaptable to doing harm. The same is
true for attempts at poisoning, State v. Clanssa, 11 Ala. 57 (1847), and
attempts to produce abortion by means of drugs, Bates v. U. S. 10 Fed.
92 (1881). But if the means used are both absolutely and apparently
inadequate, as where a man threatens another with witchery or points
* The following authorities will be found helpful: Wharton Criminal Law, 11th Ed., VoL 1, p. 238. May, 3rd, Ed., p. 167, 78 Umv. Penn.
L. R. 962, (1930) 41 H. L. R. 491, 840, 891, (Sayre), 19 Georgetown
L. J. 316, (1930-1931).

STUDENT NoTs
a toy popgun at -him then it is plain that an attempt, in so far as to
invade another's rights, does not exist.
Whether the attemptor must be physically capable of consummating the offense has been discussed slightly in its general relation above.
It will be sufficient to view it in relation to rape. Suppose a boy of
thirteen years of age is indicted for attempt of rape, the statute declaring a boy of that age incapable of committing rape. If the youth
is legally incapable of committing the crime of rape, it would seem
most illogical to convict him for the attempt to commit the offense.
A Massachusetts court, however, upheld such an indictment, Comm.
v. Green, 2 Pick. 380 (1824). In that case the court said, "a minor of
fourteen years. of age or just under, is capable of that kind of force
which constitutes an essential ingredient in the crime of rape, and
he may make an assault with an intent to commit that erime, although
by an artificial rule he is not punishable for the crime itself." It is
to be noticed that the court was somewhat influenced by the doctrine
of "societal harm" which has crept into the law of attempts from
time to time. The words used by this court that "females might be
in as much danger from precocious boys as from men, if such boys
are to escape with impunity from felohuous assaults, as well as from
the felony itself," evidence such a tendency. These precocious boys
may under such circumstances be convicted and punished for a criminal assault. There is no reason for invoking the doctrine of societal
harm by contending that the minors escape punishment.
The common law rule that an infant under fourteen years is
Incapable of committing rape or attempting to commit the crime of
rape, is well established. And if he be under that age, no evidence is
admissable to show that, in point of fact, he could commit the crime.
This has been the established law of England for many hundred years,
nor has it been departed from in the United States except perhaps in
a very few instances.
To adhere too closely to the common law rule as to the inadnssibility of evidence tending to show capacity for an infant under fourteen years, would seem to the writer to be a departure from reason
and good sense. It would also be a violation of the statute itself, by
withdrawing persons who had actually violated it, from punishment.
To substantiate my view here taken I propose to look briefly into
the origin of the common law rule. Rape is defined to be the having
of unlawful and carnal knowledge of a woman, by force and against
her will. To constitute this carnal knowledge there must be both
penetration and emission. Before a boy has arrived at age of puberty
he cannot emit seeds and 'hence is incapable of the crime of rape.
If it were an invariable law of human nature that an infant under
the age of fourteen years could not emit seed, it would be a reasonable
rule that evidence should not be permitted to contradict it. But this
law of human nature is not invariable. It is not uncommon to' find
boys under tbis age who are capable of emission. Therefore it would
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seem worse than idle to have a presumption of law that contradicts
what is necessarily true.
In the moist and cold climate of England and most countries of
Northern Europe, it is so seldom that an infant under fourteen years
is capable of emission that it is perhaps reasonably assumed that a
boy -of that age is never capable of committing rape. But in tropical
climate where the male usually arrives at puberty before the age of
fourteen, the rule instead of being founded in good reason, would
contradict both reason and fact. In our southern states the age of
puberty is frequently earlier than in the climate of England, or of
our northern states. We have among us almost every variety of the
races of men. To adopt the rule which exists in England and more
northern countries, where the climate conditions and habits of the
people are different, would be a departure from sound reasoning.
The American States have never adopted the common law in its
entirety. We have adopted only that part which is suitable to our
conditions and habits of living. We ought to modify the common law
rule under discussion to our circumstance and conditions, as set out
by the court in Williams v. State, 14 Ohio Rep. 22 (1846), saying "an
infant under age of fourteen years is presumed incapable of committing
the crime of rape or an attempt to commit it, but that presumption
may be rebutted by evidence that he has arrived at the age of puberty
and is capable of emission and consummation of the crime."
Let us suppose the incapacity is merely nervous or physical. "A
man may fail in consummating a rape from some physical or nervous
incapacity intervening between the attempt and execution. But this
failure would be no defense to the indictment for the attempt. At the
same time there must be apparent capacity." Wharton Criminal Law,
Vol. 1, 288. That capacity of success is an essential element of an
attempt was proclaamed by a high English Jurist, Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn, saying that "an attempt to commit a felony can only be
made out when, if no interruption had taken place, the attempt could
have been carried out successfully, and the felony completed of the
attempt to commit which the party is charged," Rex v. Collins, Leigh
& C. C. C. 471. We may assume that this is not the law, for apparent
adaptation is sufficient, even though the consummation was, in reality,
impossible from the first step taken toward the intended consummation.
In State v. Fitzgerald,49 Iowa 260 (1878), defendant being indicted
for attempting to commit abortion, it was held, "the fact that the
accused used a substance which would not produce a miscarriage,
would constitute no defense, if he employed it with a 0riminal intent." In Massachusetts, Comm. v. Taylor, 232 Mass. 261 (1882), a
person was convicted of an attempt to produce miscarriage of a
woman, though the woman was not pregnant.
B-IT Is IXOT Essu1TiAL THAT THE OBJEOT REAiY ExisTs.-h 1864
an English Court, Reg. Y. Collins, 9 Cox 0. C. 497, held that it w~as

STUDENT 'NOTES
error to convict a pickpocket of an attempt to commit larceny from
a pocket wlich, in fact contained no money or other valuables. It was
said that since consummation was impossible, there being no money
in the pocket, there could be no attempt. But tns case has since
been overruled in England, Beg v. Brown, 24 Q. B. Div. 357 (1889),
Beg. v. Ring, 66 Law Times (N. S.) 300 (1850), it was said, "to constitute the attempt it is not necessary to allege or prove that the
victim, at the time of the attempt, had anything in hig pocket, which
could be the subject of larceny." This represents the overwhelming
weight of authority in this country. In Clark v. State, 66 Tenn. 511
(1888), it was held that defendant who attempted to open a cash
drawer with intent to steal money therefrom was rightly convicted
of attempt to commit larceny, when in fact there was no money or
other valuables in.the drawer. In State v. Beal, 37 Ohio St. 108 (1881),
it was said that an indictment for burglary with intent to steal from
a safe would not be defeated by proof that the safe was not used as
a place of deposits for valuables. All modern authority seems to be
in accord with the proposition that it is not essential to the crime
of attempt that the object really exists. The fact that conditions exist
which render the actual consummation of the crime impossible does
not prevent the party from being guilty of the attempt, if such conditions are known to him," Clark & Marshall, 3rd Edition, p. '158,
clearly states the law on this phase of attempts. The cqurt in People
v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666 (1892), went further than most courts. There
the defendant, believing that a policeman was on the roof watching
him through a knot hole fired at the hole, with the intent to kill the
policeman. The policeman, in fact, was on a different part of the
roof. The defendant was convicted of attempt to murder. Professor
Sayre has said that one who shoots at a post with intent to kill a
human being is guilty of an attempt to murder. I have been unable
It was early held by Lord Brainto find cases that go as far as tis.
well that if A mistakes a log of wood for B, and intending to murder
B, strikes the log with an ax, this is no attempt to murder B.
The means used must be reasonably suitable to accomplishment
of the intended crime. It may nevertheless amount to an attempt,
though, it later appears that the consummation was impossible. Where
the consummation of the crime intended is legally impossible, there
can be no crime of attempt committed, People v. Gardiner, 25 N. Y.
Supp. 1072 (1893).
It has been observed that a pickpocket may be guilty of an attempt
of larceny, when there was no -money in the pocket. Yet would anyone try to suppose that if an assault should be made upon a dummy
dressed as a woman, with intent to ravish, the assailant believing the
object to be a woman, he could be convicted of an attempt to rape?
The means must not be so obviously unsuitable. The law will not
take cognizance of such an act, and the bare rntent is not punishable.
People v. Gardiner, Supra.
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There has been much discussion in the cases as to the extent to
which the means employed must be adapted to the accomplishment
of the intended crime, in order to render one guilty of an attempt.
And at this stage of the law, we may consider it well established both
-in England and this country, that an apparent possibility to commit
the crime is sufficient, but means used must not be so preposterous
that there is not even an apparent intent.
D. T. Mxurnf.
AGBNoy-IF'Amy PuRPosE DoOTiNE ix CASE oF ADuLT CHI.--.
mother who was living with her son, aged 30 and self supporting, was
given -by him an automobile upon which a liability insurance policy
was issued in her name with an omnibus coverage clause. The son
who did all the driving was using the car for business purposes with
his mother's permission and later took some friends to a road house
near the city. On the return trip he collided with a street car injuring the automobile and some of the guests. One of the injured parties
brought suit for personal injuries against the driver, the owner and
the street car company, and was given a judgment against the driver
only who was found to be execution proof. A second action was then
brought against the insurance company and recovery allowed on the
grounds that the omnibus coverage clause in the owners insurance
policy was broad enough to include her son who was driving. U. S.
Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Hall, 237 Ky. 393, 35 S. W., (2nd)
550 (1931).
While the statement in the case that the family purpose doctrine
'does not apply where an adult son inflicts injury while driving his
mother's car with her permission, is perhaps no more than dictum, as
the case apparently turns upon another point, still, it presents an
interesting problem.
It seems well settled in those states which have adopted the family
purpose doctrine that the liability of the -parent must rest upon the
doctrine of agency, or the master and servant relationship of which
agency is an outgrowth and expansion. (31 Cyc. 1191). Sale v. Atkins,
206 Ky. 224, 267 S. W 223 (1924), G'rer v. Woodsde, 200
. C. 759,
158 -S. E. 491 (1931). It cannot rest upon the theory that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality, for it is not so considered. Tyler
v. Stephan's Administratrix,163 Ky. 770, 174 S. W 790 (1915). Neither
can it rest upon the relation of parent and child, for a parent is not
generally liable for his children's torts. Arkzn v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123
N. E. 30, 5 A. L. R. 216 (1919). It follows that, regardless of whether
the child is an adult or - minor, the parent is not liable unless it is
found from the facts that there is the relationship of principal and
agent.
It does not, however, follow that when a child becomes of age, he
can no longer be his parent's agent under the family purpose doctrine.
In Malcolm v. Nunn, 226 Ky. 275, 10 S. W (2nd) 817 (1928), the court

